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IN THE

SUPP~ME

COURT OF THE

STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
vs.

CASE NO. 16802

MARY PIERREN,
Defendant-Appellant.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT AND CROSS-APPELLANT

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an action brought by the State of Utah against
the defendant

to recover public assistance payments fraudulently

obtained by the defendant.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
Plaintiff filed its complaint against defendant on
September 14, 1978, alleging that defendant had fraudulently
obtained $4,080.00 in public assistance which she was not
entitled to receive.

The hearing on this matter was before

the Honorable Judge Calvin Gould on the 11th, 12th, and 26th
of September, 1979.

Judge Gould ruled that the public

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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assistance payments made by plaintiff to defendant were induced
by defendant's fraudulent misrepresentations regarding material
matters which plaintiff relied on; namely, the defendant failed
to report that her ex-husband Pierre Pierren was living in the
home.

(R.48).

From this ruling, Judge Gould granted judgment

in favor of the plaintiff for $3,066.00 of the contested
$4,080.00.

(R.49).
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL

Respondent asks this court for an aff irmance of the
lower court's decision regarding defendant's fraud in obtaining
public assistance.

In addition, respondent urges this court

to grant respondent a judgment of $4, 080. 00 instead of $3, 066.0~
granted by the lower court.
STATEMENT QF THE FACTS
In this case, the evidence admitted during the trial
regarding defendant's public assistance records and her divorce
decree was not made part of the appellate record.

As a result,

defendant placed this evidence in the back of her brief for
the Court's reference.

To avoid duplication, respondent will

also refer to the appendices in the back of defendant's brief.
In April 1976 defendant applied for public assistance
and food stamps from the State of Utah.

On her assistance

application, defendant named only herself and her four children
as members of the household.

{Appendix A of defendant's brief)

Defendant listed her husband, Pierre Pierren, as being absent
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from the home for the last 10 months.

(Appendix A) .

Defendant

also signed her application with the understanding that she was
to notify the Assistance Payments Administration (APA) office
regarding any changes in the makeup of her household.

(Appendix

A, last page) .
On September 21, 1976, defendant reapplied for assistance
and food stamps, and again listed only herself and her children
as members of the household.

(Appendix B) .

The question regarding

a man in the home, was deliberately left blank by the defendant.
(R. 259,260).

On March 7, 1977, a similar reapplication for

assistance and food stamps was executed by the defendant, and once
again defendant named only herself and children as members of the
household.

(Appendix C).

On July 16, 1976, Pierre and Mary Pierren entered the
office of the Brigadoon Apartments together; and had a rental
agreement signed in Pierre's name listing Pierre and Mary Pierren
as tenants of the same apartment.

(R. 113, 114, 153, 176).

From July 16, 1976, to May of 1977, tenants and employees of the
Brigadoon Apartments were of the opinion that Mary and Pierre lived
together.

(R. 118, 119, 135, 144, 157).

Their opinions were

based on the following facts and observations;

(1) Pierre was

seen on a daily basis around and about the apartment (R. 114, 124,
132, 141, 154).

(2)

Pierre was observed in the apartment

during all times of the day.
(3)

(R. 124, 132, 144, 145, 157).

Pierre would pay the rent of the apartment with checks

made payable to him.

(R. 116).

(4) Pierre and Mary would often

play cards and have parties at their apartment with other
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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tenants_ of the Brigadoon Apartments (R. 132, 133, 143).
(5)

Mary told. two of the tenants of the Brigadoon Apartments,

that "if anybody from Welfare comes around, don't tell them
that we are living together."

{R. 134, 144).

In fact, such a substantial amount of testimony and
evidence was presented during the trial showing that Pierre
and Mary lived together; Judge Gould was impressed to make the
following remark:
"But it is hard for me to see, Mr .. Dazey, how,
without having investigators actually walk through
the bedroom how the State could put in a case very
much stronger than this on that point." (R. 270).
Once it was established Pierre lived with Mary, the
unrefuted testimony of Victor Larsen showed that defendant woula
have been ineligible for financial assistance had the truth been
known.

(R. 171).

Therefore, Judge Gould ruled that the

defendant was ineligible for financial assistance payments
from August, 1976 to May, 1977.

(R.

46)~

ARGUMENT
Point I
THE TRIAL JUDGE DID NOT ERR WHEN HE ·HELD THE STATE
HAD PROVEN ITS BURDEN BY CLEAR Al~D CONVINCING
EVIDENCE THAT PIERRE PIERREN WAS LIVING IN DEFENDANT'S
HOUSEHOLD.
In the present case, one matter needs to be made
emphasized; the defendant would not have been eligible for Aid
to Families with Dependent Children {AFDC)

if she would have

listed Pierre Pierren a member of her household.

{R.

171).

Since the information was withheld, she received AFDC
assistance
to which she was not entitled.
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At this point it is important to distinguish
the various types of public assistance programs.
three distinctive programs:

between

There are

(R. 271-273).

1.

Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC)

2.

Aid to Families with Dependent Children Unemployed Parents (AFDC-U) .

3.

General Assistance (GA)

The eligibility requirements for each type of assistance
are different and the "income and resource" classifications are
also different.

The defendant, Mary Pierren, applied for and

received AFDC benefits.

It is not the duty of this court to

make a determination that she was eligible for any other type
of assistance than that for which she applied.

For example:

to be eligible for AFDC-U or GA, the defendant would have had to
report on her application that her ex-husband, Pierre Pierren, was
a member of her household.

In addition, to maintain eligibility

for the AFDC-U or GA programs, the defendant's ex-husband would
have had to enroll in various work projects.

Since Pierre's

presence in defendant's household was unreported, defendant's
eligibility for assistance can only be determined under the
specific criterion she applied, AFDC.
In determining if defendant's children were eligible
for AFDC, it must first be considered whether the children were
"dependent" within the meaning of the Social Security Act
§406(a), 42 U.S.C.A. §606(a).

The Social Security Act defines

a dependent child as a "needy child .

who has been deprived

of parental support or care by reason of the death, continued
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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hnme, or physical or mental incapacity of a

parent. . . " 4 2 U ~ S. C. A.

§ 6 O6

(a) .

In the present case defendant contends that her childre

were eligible for AFDC because (1) Pierre was continually abseru

from the home, or ( 2) even if he wasn't, the children were still
needy because Pierre did not furnish any support.

In answer

to ?.e:Eendant' s second argument the lan<!mark decision of King v.
Smith, 392 U.S. 309, · (1968) should be controlling.
In King v. Smith, the United States Supreme Court
analyzes the history of the AFDC program and states the followi
reasons for the program's enactment:
"The AFDC program was designed to meet a
need unmet by programs providing employment for
breadwinners.
It was designed to protect what the
House Report characterized as '[o]ne clearly
distinguishable group of children.' H.R. Rep. No.
615, 74th Cong., 1st Sess., 10 (1935). This group
was composed of children in families without a
breadwinner,' 'wage earner,' or 'father,' as the
repeated use of these terms throughout the Report
of the President's Committee, Committee Hearings
and Reports ~nd the floor debates make perfectly
clear.
To describe the sort of breadwinner that it
had in mind, Congress employed the word 'parent.'
49 Stat.
629, as amended, 42 U.S.C. §606(a). A
child would be eligible for assistance if his parent
was deceased, incapacitated or continually absent."
King v. Smith, 392, U.S. at 328.

In otherwords, AFDC was not

set up to take care of all needy children but only those needy
children who are deprived of their parent because he is dead,
incapacitated or continually absent.

See Graham v. Shaffer, li

Ariz. App. 497, 498 P.2d 571 (1972).

Thus, the issue of wheth

or not the parent furnishes support is not a determinative
factor.

In fact, this point is substantiated by the following

statement in King v. Smith, supra,
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

"The State correctly observes that the fact
that the man in question does not actually support
the child cannot be determinative, because a natural
father at home may fail actually to support his
child but his presence will still render the child
ineligible for assistance." 392 U.S. at 329 (Emphasis
added) .
In King v. Smith,

(the controlling U.S. Supreme Court

case on AFDC matters) all that is needed to render defendant's
household ineligible for AFDC is the presence of Pierre in the
home.

Since Pierre was in the home, defendant's household was

ineligible, regardless of whether or not Pierre furnished the
children support.
An example of one of the cases following the King v.
Smith rationaleis Trull v. District of Columbia Dept. of Public
Welfare, 268 A.2d 859 (D.C. 1970).

In Trull the father forced

himself into the home over the objections of his wife.

The

father remained in the home and did not work on the outside,
even though he was able-bodied and employable.

In upholding a

determination of ineligibility for AFDC, the Court stated that
there must be both a need and deprivation, i.e., the child must
be deprived of "the support of at least one parent by reason
of the parent's death, incapcity or continued absence from the
home."

Trull 268 A.2d at 860.

The fact that Mr. Trull was

living in the home (in other words he was not "absent from" the home)
was sufficient.

It was immaterial that he was unemployed and

did not contribute support.

The court concluded its decision by

stating that the children would remain ineligible until their father
left home.
Since Pierre's non-support or support of the children
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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defendant's eligibility for AFDC; the

_...,_

only remaining contention by defendant that her household
was eligible is that Pierre was continually absent from the
home.

In Smith v. Hueker, 531 F.2d 1355 (6 C.C.A. 1976)

the Court points out that the federal legislation does not defb
the term "continued absence." However, the term "continued
absence" is mentioned in the federal regulation, 45 C.F.R.
§233.90

(c) (1) (iii), which states,
"Continued absence of the parent from
the home constitutes the reason for deprivation
of parental support or care when the parent is
out of the home, the nature of the absence is such
as either to interrupt or to terminate the parent's
functioning as a provider of maintenance, physical
care, or guidance for the child, and the known or
indefinite duration of the absence precludes counting
on the parent's performance of his function in planning
for the present support or care of the child.
If these
conditions exist, the parent may have left only recen~
or some time previously."

The Utah regulation for deprivation of support (APA Reg.
Vol. II §224) basically states this same definition.

Thus,

the definition of "continued absence" from the above regulation
shows that if the parent is not out of the home, then all of
the conditions do not exist for the parent to come under the
definition of continually absent.
To understand the definition of "continued absence "
better, it is beneficial to analyze the parts of the

definiti~

The following example which breaks down the parts of the defini
of continued absence is helpful.

Example:

For a parent to be

considered continually absent from the home the parent must
meet all of the conditions below:
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(1)

The parent must be out of the home.

(2)

The parent's absence interrupt's or terminates
the parent's functioning

as a provider of

maintenance, physical care, or guidance for
the child,
(3)

and

The known or indefinite duration of the absence
precludes counting on the parent's performance
of his function in planning for the present support
or care of the child.

In the present case the first element.of the definition for
continued absence was never met because Pierre was in the home.
Thus, the other element of the definition dcesnot need to be
considered because the failure to meet the first element rendered
defendant's household ineligible for AFDC.
In the cases cited in defendant's first point, she has
confused the present case by showing how some courts grappled
with the second and third elements of the "continued absence"
definition.

This court does not need to concern itself with the

second and third elements, because Pierre did not meet the
condition set forth in the first element.

Pierre was not away

from the home!
An example of how defendant's first point in her brief

is confusing, is illustrated in the case of Freeman v. Lukard,
465 F. Supp. 1269 (D.C.E.D. Va., Richmond Div., 1979).

In

Freeman the children were found ineligible .for AFDC benefits
because the father did not meet the second element of the
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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"contin_ued absent" defintion.

The first element {absence from

the home) was met by the father and was stated as an undisputed
fact.

The following comments by the Freeman court

substantiati

this;
"The undisputed facts are as follows."
" ... although the father was absent from the
home he continued to visit the younger children
daily, discuss their care with the plaintiff, and
provide them with milk and diapers."
Freeman 465 F. Supp. at 1271.
The above statement shows that the Freeman court
was not concerned about whether the father was in the home
or away from the home, that element was already well established
by the undisputed facts.

What the court in Freeman used to reno'

the defendant ineligible for AFDC, was the finding that the fatl
had not met the second element of the ''continued absent" definiti
Since Pierre does not fit in the "continued absent"
definition unless he is out of the home, the next question that
needs to be answered in this case, is what is meant by being
the home, or in other words being in the home.

o~

One can if he

-wishes cite several cases which define "living together" or
'living with", however, this court should keep in mind that those
terms are not words of art.

For example, the defendant cites

the case of Johnson v. Finch, 350 F. Supp. ·945 {D. Tex. 1972),
and concludes that the same analysis of that decision should
apply to the case at bar.

The court should compare the wording

in the case of bemaray v. Mannerud Const. Co., 128 N.W. 2d S51
{S.D. 1964), wherein construing Workmen's Compensation Regulati
the
court concluded that "living with" does not impart dwelling
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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together and that the
wife could be

st

be deemed "living with" her husband.

Respondent's argument

is that the principle of stare decisis should not be applied
to rule that the defendant's ex-husband did or did not "live in" or
"was or was not absent from the home" her home.

This case must

be decided upon its own facts and circumstances.
The defendant cites several cases in Point I of her
brief, and states for each case the reasons why the court concluded
that the father of the children was in the home.
should also be examined in the same fashion.

This case

When the facts and

testimonies of this case were scrutinized closely at the trial
it was clear to the court that the State met its burden and showed
by clear and convincing evidence that Pierre was in the home.
(R.

270).

A case showing that the evidence in the present case is
sufficient to prove fraud is Beech v. State, 319 N.E. 2d 678
(Ind. 1974).

In

Beec~,

the defendant argued that her alcoholic

husband, was absent from the home.

However, several neighbors

of the defendant testified that they saw Mr. and Mrs. Beech often
together, at all times of the day.

With the testimonies of the

neighbors and a welfare investigator, a

lower court in Indiana

found that Mr. Beech was not absent from the home under a
criminal standard of beyond a reasonable doubt.

In addition, it

is interesting to note that Mrs. Beech was convicted without
the State having to prove that Mr. and Mrs. Beech maintained
conjugal relationships or that Mr. Beech ever spent the night
with the defendant.

On appeal Mrs. Beech's conviction was affirmed.
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The facts in this case are very similar to Beech, howev1

the present ca~e did not require a standard of beyond a reason~
doubt for Judge Gould to rule in the State's favor.

The presen1

case only required a standard of clear and convincing evidence.
This standard was clearly met by the State when four witnesses

who were personal friends of the defendant testified that Piern
was at defendant's home almost every day, at all times of
(R.114, 124, 132, 141, 144, 154, 157, 203).

the~

The witnesses also

testified that Mary and Pierre never gave any indication that ti
were separated or divorced.

In fact, Pierre and Mary were so

concerned that the neighbors across the hall knew they were livi.

together that they specifically requested them not to tell the .
welfare man.

(R. 134, 144).

The neighbors interpreted this

statement to mean that the defendant was getting money she knew
was not entitled to receive.

(R. 137, 138, 144).

Therefore,

s·

~

present case Judge Gould did not err when he held

defendant's~

( R. 4 5 , 4 6) •

Other eviden

husbandwas not absent from the home.

substantiating Pierre being in the home is contained in the
·statement of facts.

Other evidence is too numerous to list.
Point II

THE TRIAL JUDGE'S FINDING DID NOT VIOLATE DEFENDANT'S
DUE PROCESS RIGHTS BECAUSE NO CONCLUSIVE PRESUMPTION
WAS MADE WITH RESPECT TO PIERRE PIERREN FURNISHING
MAINTENANCE, PHYSICAL CARE OR GUIDANCE TO HIS CHILDREN·
In Point I of the argument, it was pointed out that
the ~sue before ~he lower court was whether or not Pierre was
present in defendant's household.

The finding by Judge Gould

that
Pierre was in defendant's household, was enough in and of
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Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-12-

itself to render defendant ineligible for AFDC.

Thus,

whether or not Pierre provided support to his children
did not need to be determined and was irrelevant to this
case.
The defendant in this case seems to have the same
"fundamental misconception" about AFDC as did the defendant
in Shannon v. Department of Human Services, 157 N.J. Sup.
251, 384 A.2d 899 (Super. Ct. N.J., App. Div. 1976).

In

that case -the irrebuttable presumption argument was also
raised.

The court stated the argument lacked merit giving

the following explanation;
Appellant raises several substantive
points of argument, all of which, in our
view, lack merit. First, appellant contends
that the agency's interpretation of the term
"continued absence" as excluding frequent
visition by a purportedly "absent" parent
raised an irrebuttable and improper presumption that the child is being supported
by the visiting parent.
In making this argument appellant discloses a fundamental
misconception concerning the purpose and
scooe of the federally-funded AFDC assistance program. Although the financial need.
of a child is an essential condition to eligibility under the program, need alone is insufficient. The protection afforded by the
AFDC program extends to children who are
found to be in need of financial assistance
and who, while living in New Jersey, have
"been deprived of parental support or care
by reason of the death, continued absence
from the home, or physical or mental incapacity of a parent." N.J.S.A. 44:10-l(c).
Hence, the program was designed to protect
a clearly distinguishable group of children
in need of financial assistance, those lacking
a parent through death, physical or mental
incapacity or continued absence. See King
v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309, 88 S.Ct. 2128, 20
L.Ed.2d 1118 (1968).
This limitation on those
eligible for benefits thereunder is emphasized
byQuinney
theLawdeletion
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,

")_

l(c) (1) of a provision extending protection to
a child living with both parents where the
father is unemployed or the earnings of both
parents are insufficient.* [*Refers to New Jersey's
AFDC-U program]
Clearly under the law pertinent to the present
controversy, eligibility for benefits was determined not only by financial need but by the absence
of a parent whether by reason of death, incapacity
or continued absence, this latter condition independent of financial support being needed or provided.
(Brackets; Footnote reference, Emphasis Added).
Shannon, 384 A.2d at 900,901.
Since, defendant applied for AFDC assistance and not
AFDC-U, the only concern before this court is whether or not
the evidence supports the conclusion that Pierre was in
household.

defend~

Thus, the conclusive presumption argument raised by

defendant is irrelevant to this case.
Point III
DEFENDANT'S ARGUMENT CONTESTING THE AFDC REGULATIONS
AS VAGUE, WAS NOT RAISED IN THE PLEADINGS NOR PUT IN
ISSUE AT THE TRIAL AND CANNOT BE CONSIDERED FOR THE
FIRST TIME ON APPEAL.
The third point in defendant's brief is now being
·to this court for the first time on appeal.

pres~

This issue was

n~

put in issue in any form through pleadings, motion, or at trial.
This argument is therefore improperly before this court and is
not to be considered.
the years that:

The Utah Supreme Court has stated over

"matters neither raised in the pleadings norp

in issue at trial cannot be considered for the first time on
appeal."

Wagner v. Olsen, 25 Utah 2d 366, 482 P.2d 702, 704

(1971).

See also, Park City Utah Corp. Ensign Co., 586 P. 2 d

(l978),
Edgar
v. Funding
Wagner,
572
P.2d
405 of (1977),
and
others tc
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numerous to cite.

This Court rei ter

ter

raised for the first time on appeal, in a recent welfare fraud
case by stating the following;

"We have consistently held that

matters not raised in the trial court will not be considered on
appeal!'

pepartment of Social Services v. Lester Romero aka

Ralph G. Romero, slip
20, 1980).

opinio~,

page 2, no. 16551 (filed March

Thus, this Court should not consider whether or not

the AFDC regulations deny due process by being vague.
Even assuming arguendo that this Court considers
defendant's third point; this Court should still reject the
argument.

In

~reaves

v. State of Utah, 528 P.2d 805, 807 (Utah

1974), the Utah Supreme Court stated the following:
"the presumption of validity hereinabove stated,
gives rise to the rule that a statute will not
be declared unconstitutional for that reason if
under any sensible interpretation of its language
it can be given practical effect."
And in Wagner v. Salt Lake City, 29 Utah 2d 42, 504 P.2d
1007, 1012 (1972), this Court stated as follows:
"The fact that the legislature may have been
more specific in its wording of a statute does
not render it unconstitutional."
The above cases show that there is a presumption in favor of
constitutionality.

The AFDC regulation which defines continued

absence is specific enough to give practical effect to its
governing statute.

It states that one condition for the

household to be eligible for AFDC is that the parent is out
of the home.

45 C.F.R. §233.90 (c) (1) (iii).

Although,

courts

have at times struggled with what is meant by a parent being out
of the home, the courts still have been able to apply the
definition quite uniformly

by analyzing all the facts and

circumstances
each
case.
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In the present case, four people that were friends
of the defendant and who were constantly around the Brigadoon
Apartments were able to form an opinion that Mary and Pierre
lived together.

(R.118, 119, 135, 144, 157).

In fact, Mary

and Pierre must have been able to understand the meaning of
living together, or why else would they have made the statement to their neighbors across the hall not to tell the
welfare man that they were living together.

(R. 134, 144).

In addition, the application forms for AFDC assistance
are very clear.

The forms ask specifically for the applicant

list all members of the household.

(Appendices Band C)

to

The

applications also specifically request that the applicant infun
the APA off ice of any changes in family size or any other
circumstances which would affect the_ grant amount,

(Appendix

A, last page).
In the present case, the defendant had been on public
assistance several times and was well aware of the regulatioM
affecting her grant.

(R. 258-260).

She did not list her ex-

· husband on the public assistance forms because she knew that
it would render her ineligible for AFDC.

Thus, this court

should reject her argument that the AFDC regulations are too
vague.
Point IV
THE STATE SUFFERED ACTUAL DAMAGES WHEN IT
PAID FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE TO THE DEFENDANT
WHO HAD FRAUDULENTLY INDUCED PAYMENTS
American Jurisprudence 2d states the following:
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"The measure of damages for fraud is, as a general rule, the
actual pecuniary loss sustained."
and Deceit (1968).

37 Am Jur. 2d §342 rraud

Therefore, the measure of damages which

respondent should have against defendant is $4,080.00 dollars;
the amount respondent was induced to pay to defendant because
of her fraudulent misrepresentations.
Defendant contends that the money she fraudulently
obtained should be paid back to the State, by the State collecting
her child support payments.
desired.

Such reasoning leaves a lot to be

In other words, defendant wants to benefit from her

fraud.
In the first place, defendant would never have been able
to assign her child support payments, a chose in action, to the
State if she would have been truthful on her public assistance
application.

The assignment of defendant's support payments

only came about as a result of defendant's misrepresentations.
Therefore, since the assignment was induced by fraud, it is
voided and of no value.
In this action, the State is recovering from the
defendant that which the defendant defrauded the State.

To

require the State to recover the defrauded amount from defendant's
debtors would be a grave injustice to the State and would allow the
defendant to benefit from her own wrong.

Such a ruling should

be rejected because it would only encourage more welfare fraud.
Point V
FOR A HOUSEHOLD TO BE ELIGIBLE FOR AFDC, THERE
MUST BE A SHOWING OF NEED, AND THERE MUST BE A
DEPRIVATION
PARENTAL
SUPPORT.
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As was stated in the first point of this brief,
King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309
AFDC assistance.

(1968) is the governing case for

The holding in King v. Smith is that

eligibility for AFDC is two pronged.

The first prong is

that the dependent children must be needy.

The second prong

is that not all needy_ children are eligible, but only those
needy children who are deprvied of parental support.
42 U.S.C.A.

§

(under

606(a)).

Graham v. Shaffer, 17 Ariz. App. 497, 498 P.2d 571
(1972), also states that a household must show more than need fu
AFDC..

The following passages explain this point:
"The Senate Com.rnittee, in its reports preceding
the enactment of the AFDC program, pointed out that
the program was not intended to protect all needy
-children. The report stated that ' many of the
children included in relief families present no other
problem than that of providing work for the breadwinner
of the family." (Citation omitted) Graham, 498 P.2d 573.

And on page 574, the court adds this comment:
"Congress did not intend for the family with an
unemployed 'breadwinner ' to be covered by this specific
program (AFDC) unless he came under one of the disabili·
ties mentioned in 42 U.S.C. §606(a)."
From the above case law it is clear that Congress passed

AFDC

so that families with a parent absent could receive financial
assistance.

If both parents were present in the home and the

breadwinner was unemployed then the family would need to apply
for assistance under the AFDC-U program.
Defenda~t applied for her financial assistance under

the

AFDC

program and deliberately withheld information that

would
ultimately
render
her
ineligible.
is and
not
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this court to make a determination t .. ~. -·

other type of assistance than that for which she applied.
(See Point I of this brief).
home, defendant

di~

Therefore, since Pierre was in the

not meet the two prong test for

AFDC

eligibility.
Point VI
THE JUDGMENT OF AWARDING THE STATE ONLY
$3,066.00 IS NOT CONSI-STENT WITH THE LOWER
COUR'l'"S FINDING THAT THE DEFENDANT WAS INELIGIBLE
FOR AFDC ASSISTANCE.
The State's basis for its cross-appeal is that Judge
Gould's holding which found the defendant ineligible for AFDC
assistance from August 1976 to May, 1977 is inconsistent with
the judgment of $3,066.00.

The State paid the defendant $4,080.00

in AFDC assistance during the contested period and this is the
amount the State should be reimbursed.

(R.

56-58).

The State brought this action against defendant to recover
only financial assistance.

(AFDC benefits).

The State agreed

at trial that the defendant was eligible for food stamp assistance
during the time in question.

(R. 57) .

In fact, the defendant

received food stamp assistance every monthdlring August, 1976 to
May, 1977.

However, part of the financial assistance given to

the defendant was deducted under the optional Public Assistance
Withholding program (PAW), to enable the defendant to purchase
her food stamps.

(R. 57, 58)

If the defendant had not elected

to have her food stamps purchased through the

PAW

program,

then she would have had to pay in cash, the amount of the PAW
deduction to receive her food stamps.
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At this point, it is important to discuss how food
stamp assistance is determined and purchased.

The amount of

food stamps allotted to a household is based on the household's
family size and monthly net adjusted income.

Based on the

adjusted monthly net income the household pays a determined
amount for the foodstamps received.

(Financial assistance

AFDC benefits is inctuded in the household's adjusted monthly
net income, See APA Reg., Vol. II §401.15).

The difference

between the amount of foodstamps received and the amount paid
is the bonus, or the foodstamp assistance.
As stated before, this bonus or food stamp assistance
the defendant received is not contested.

What is contested is

lower court's ruling of including the PAW deduction as part
of the food stamp assistance.

The PAW is an optional program

which is used by welfare recipients who are receiving money
from more than one welfare program.

For example:

if a person

with a household of 5 and no outside income was receiving $408J
in AFDC, and was also eligible for food stamp assistance that
·person would have the following two options available.

The

applicant could either receive the $408.00 in financial assisW
and then pay a portion of .that financial assistance to receive
her food stamp allotment (applicant pays $110.00 to receive
$189.00 in food stamps, result a bonus of $79.00) or she could
have a portion of her financial assistance grant deducted under
PAW and the deducted amount would be used to purchase her
food stamps (Deduct $110.00 to received $189.00 in food stamps
result
a bonus of $79.ooiunder either option the applicant
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receives the same in AFDC aid and food stamp assistance.

Therefore,

the bonus is food stamp assistance but the PAW deduction is not.
The PAW program was instituted so that welfare recipients
could avoid the inconvenience of having to bring their welfare
money in to purchase food

st~rnps.

PAW was not set up to be a

supplement, for food stamp assistance.

If defendant had been

ineligible for AFDC, she would have purchased food stamps out
of her own money, or if she would have had no money she would
have received a bonus amount of food stamps.

Since defendant

was not eligible for AFDC, due to her fraudulent_ misrepresentation,
her AFDC benefits of $408.00 was included in her monthly adjusted
net income.

See APA Reg., Vol II 401.15.

Defendant's election

to use the PAW program made it easier for her to receive all her
welfare benefits.

The election did not increase the amount of her

food stamp bonus.

Thus, the State should be awarded the $4,080.00

in AFDC benefits which defendant fraudulently obtained.
CONCLUSION
The defendant misrepresented on her public. assistance
application forms essental information used to determine her
eligibility for AFDC.

As ,a result of her misrepresentations,

defendant obtained $4,080.00 in AFDC which she was not entitled
to receive.

A great injustice would occur to the State if

defendant, who perpetrated her fraud, is allowed to retain any of
these funds.
The State at the trial level proved by clear and
convincing evidence that defendant's ex-husband was in the home.
The unreported presence of defendant's ex-husband in the home,
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was sufficient by itself, to render defendant's household
ineligible for AFDC.

Therefore, any evidence regarding Pierre':

support of his children is irrelevant to the case at bar.
Defendant's contention attacking the APA regulations
on vagueness grounds should also be rejected.

This argument is

raised for the first time on appeal, and even if it wasn't
defendant understood the regulations in as much as she specifically requested two of her neighbors not to tell the welfare
man that she and Pierre lived together.
The State in this case suffered actual damages of
$4,089.00 and should not be required to collect this money
from defendant's debtors.

The State should be allowed to

recover the $4,080.00 from the one who committed the fraud.
In addition, the defendant should not benefit, from the lower
court's misunderstanding of the PAW program.

This program

is not a supplement for foodstamp assistance, but is just an
efficient way of accounting for all of one's welfare needs.
Since defendant was ineligible for AFDC and was not
entitled to receive anything from the program, the State should
be awarded $4,080.00 the amount obtained by the defendant due to
her fraud.

Thus, the respondent urges this court to affirm

the lower court's finding that defendant committed fraud in
obtaining AFDC assistance.

The respondent also requests this

court to reverse the lower court's judgment of $3,066.00 and
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in its place grant the State judgment for $4,080.00.
Respectfully submitted,
ROBERT B. HANSEN
Attorney General
STEPHEN G. SCHWENDIMAN
Assistant Attorney General
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